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POLICE SCIENCE
A CASE FOR DE-SPECIALIZATION OF TRAFFIC OPERATIONS
PALMER STINSON
Lieutenant Palmer Stinson has been a member of the Oakland Police Department for the last
eleven years and is currently assigned to the Traffic Division. His career within the department has
included various assignments as a patrolman in the Traffic Division as well as other police opera-
tions and as a sergeant and lieutenant in general line activities prior to his present assignment. Lieu-
tenant Stinson recently completed a course at Northwestern University Traffic Institute and has
had material published in their Traffic Digest and Revieu,.-EDITOR.
PREFACE
A trend toward traffic specialization has con-
tinued at an accelerated pace over the last 25
years-a "jump on the bandwagon" trend-too
often based on mimicry instead of analysis. In
this report there is an attempt to show some cause
to head in the opposite direction.
Protagonists of the specialized traffic division,
particularly those with a vested interest, are
certain to object vociferously to the changes
proposed in the following pages. Although such
protests are natural, anticipation of them prompts
the writer to direct the reader's attention to a
phenomenon inevitably associated with the
-creation of special agencies. This is the growth of
.a top-heavy hierarchy (which expands spon-
taneously for reasons best illustrated in the satire
on Civil Service by C. Northcote Parkinson). The
very existence of this group of "Empire builders"
is the greatest 'obstacle to intelligent appraisal of
the need for change.
There are emotional overtones involved in the
"shift in emphasis" the writer proposes, and he
pleads guilty to being party to these feelings.
Although he has tried to be fair in his presentation,
some subjectively flavored phrases are certain to
creep into this report. No apology is meant by
these lines-only candor. He would rather make it
.abundantly clear that every word represents his
honest measure of the situation.
INTRODUCTION
In our municipalities there has been a sharp
increase in the number and kind of tasks delegated
to the police. Although the .new duties are often
only remotely connected to primary police pur-
poses, few enforcement officials successfully restrict
the scope of police activity, and as a matter of
course the numerical strength of the patrol arm
decreases. Chauffeuring, bicycle licensing, dog-
catching, and parking meter maintenance are
examples of the more prosaic duties pressed upon
the police. A patrolman begins to feel concern
about the availability of street sweepers in his
city when he finds himself burdened with such
tasks.
It is axiomatic that a police department's
efficiency and reputation depend upon the vigor
and skill of' its patrol force. Consequently, neces-
sity's sharp pinch has made manpower distribution
a critical problem for many police chiefs. It has
become imperative that the shrinking blue line of
patrolmen be strategically deployed throughout a
city for greatest utility.
Pressures for more services have also spurred
many departments into aggressive nation-wide
recruiting. Progressive departments which acti-
vely proselyte throughout the states have been
handsomely rewarded by increased general com-
petence. Men with qualifications unsurpassed
anywhere in the world are now being attracted to
the American police service. With this growing
proportion of intelligent, trained, and hopeful
members comprising the rank and file of our
police forces, it becomes increasingly important
that the patrolman's present role of report taker
and door shaker be elevated to one commensurate
with his present abilities.
Some police departments have learned through
experience that proper structuring of the organiza-
tion is essential to an effective program of service.
Others have ignored the lessons to be learned,
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living with their mistakes and often blissfully
unaware of ways to improve their lot. In this
paper some dominant factors affecting the degree
and kind of traffic specialization are examined.
There is no attempt to be exhaustive. Problems
engendered by present specialized structures are
reviewed with attention mainly confined to Acci-
dent Reporting and Traffic Law Enforcement. It is
in these areas of police work that the tail begins to
wag the dog. It is hoped that the discussion of
these matters will stimulate readers to review
conditions as they are in their own departments
and possibly to modify their attitudes toward
specialized traffic activities.
HISTORY OF TRAFFIC SPECIALIZATION
As far back as 1939, all cities over 250,000
inhabitants had special traffic divisions in their
police departments. Smaller cities were quick to
follow the lead of the big urban areas. Today it is
not uncommon to find a police force of only 20 or
30 men with the responsibility for traffic functions
invested in a special unit of three to five men;
while larger departments generally assign 11 to
14 percent of their total employees to the traffic
unit. These units are usually manned by transfers
from the patrol division with resulting depletion
of that force.
Traditionally, the traffic problem has been met
by building up expensive traffic divisions; yet the
problem has grown faster than the abilities of the
specialized units to cope with it. Police managers
have adopted specialized traffic units with little
regard for factors unique to their situation. With
the myriad degrees, kinds, and arrangements
possible, it is strange to observe most all municipal
police departments still embracing the stereotype
of a traffic division designed twenty-five years ago.
It becomes readily apparent that police admini-
strators have failed to tailor their organization to
their needs. They have been content to let "con-
tests" and "inventories" mold their department
into a shape that-in many instances-lessened
the functional efficiency of the force as a whole.
In the traffic division patterned after the classic
model, all traffic operations-with the occasional
exception of a few fixed traffic posts-become the
responsibility of the special unit. The patrol
divisions, as a consequence of mass transfers to
traffic, very naturally exhibit great disinterest in
traffic law enforcement and accident reporting. In
a few cities, it is true, administrative attention
has generated-mainly through exhortation-
some action by patrolmen in enforcing traffic
statutes. At the same time, however, special
traffic training for the patrol forces has been
minimal, and to date a great potential remains
untapped.
On the positive side, it must be recognized that
fine quality training for members of the special
enforcement squads has helped make our city
streets safer. Compliance with traffic regulation
has become "stylish" and unlawful behavior
"unrewarding" as a result of enforcement by
hard-working traffic specialists.
The value of a police accident "investigation"
program is less amenable to critical judgment.
The never-ending statistical summaries, so often
submitted as "proof" of extravagant claims, are
without value as determinants of efficiency. Even
the complimentary appraisal of special enforce-
ment efforts in a preceding paragraph depends
upon empirical and necessarily subjective observa-
tion rather than statistical validation.
There is pressure now toward acceptance of the
line power idea, where the total line resources of
the department are made available for meeting
traffic problems when and where necessary. This
concept-supported by men who have contributed
most to American police thinking for 20 years-
provides the framework of a strong case against
total traffic specialization.
It is worth noting here that Franklin Kreml-
probably the most articulate of the proponents of
the specialized traffic division-acknowledged
(in his Beecroft Lecture) that the traffic division
might be only a transitional device; an apparatus
to be used as a stop gap measure pending the
development of general line competence.
Without regard to their value, it must be
acknowledged that large urban traffic divisions
have operated virtually unchanged in structural
form for at least twenty years. The time has come
for a long, hard look at the alleged need for speciali-
zation. A re-weighing of values in terms of today's
needs is in order.
THE POLICE ROLE LN TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS
One of the strongest arguments put forward by
the advocates of specialization in investigating
accidents was based upon the complexity of the
task and the importance of determining the causes
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of accidents. They held that such investigations
were too sophisticated for the lowly patrolman,
and therefore we had to train only the highest
calibre men for the job. It is true that the specialists
stripped patrol of some of their most promising
young men for accident investigation, but their
success in finding useful accident causes was
largely illusionary.
For two decades, traffic police administrators
generally have deluded themselves with extra-
vagant claims of benefits reaped from their acci-
dent "investigations." They envisioned a horde of
researchers, educators, sociologists, psychologists,
and economists breathlessly awaiting the mass of
non-digestible and largely useless data being
continually ground out by the thousands of
specialized traffic units. This statistical apparatus
can be likened to a huge sausage iactory-with
the same product-baloney. Actually, scientists
working on research projects have found the
data from police "investigations" of auto accidents
very crude and grossly lacking in refinement. An
engineer' who is one of the world's foremost
research authorities in the traffic accident field has
categorically stated that police accident investiga-
tions do not determine the causes of accidents with
any useful degree of certainty and that it is not
economically practical to investigate-in the full
sense of the word-all accidents that come to the
attention of the police. This strong statement is
not introduced as a criticism of police accident
programs, but rather as an attempt to strip some
of the tinsel from a basically sound police product,
the accident report.
Law enforcement administrators must recognize
the limitations of police accident investigations
and design reporting procedures that facilitate
attainment of the following legitimate objectives:
1. Identification of the principals.
2. Prosecution of violators (within economically
justifiable limits).
3. Recording a limited amount of data that has
been closely scrutinized as to its usefulness.
In this manner accident reporting can be simplified.
The important police objectives will then be
attained; yet less time will be spent by the patrol
officer in handling this activity.
1 In a conversation with the author-naming him in
print would embarrass him since his wages are paid by
an institution dedicated to perpetuation of traffic
specialization.
TRAFFIC STATISTIC USES-AND ABUSES
Both traffic and safety officials have a great
affinity for statistics. They rely heavily on them
to "prove" the value of their programs. Unfor-
tunately, the confidence they place in their "facts
and figures" is not equally shared by most statisti-
cians and great caution must be exercised in
interpreting the mass of figures that have their
origin in police accident reports.
There are two principal defects in traffic accident
statistics. First, the published figures often do not
mean anything. They may be superficial, obscure
or too complicated to be of value. For instance,
several hundred city traffic units and 17 state
traffic agencies in the United States collect, on a
continuing basis, statistics relating to vision
ohscurement noted in accident investigations. The
presence of trees, signboards, buildings, etc. is
often recorded without regard to their contribution
to the accident. They also diligently summarize
year after year figures on race, sex, age, and occu-
pation of the drivers. This kind of information is
trivial and unimportant (in the usual summary
form) to the collecting agency. This type of
information is occasionally used to "prove"
relationships or conditions already known with
accuracy sufficient for all practical purposes.
Secondly, some-figures do not tell the whole
truth. Causal factors, not obvious to the non-expert
reader, that should be to the competent statistician
are not mentioned. The most common example of
this abuse occurs in connection with fatality rates.
Rates will often drop and safety officials quickly
claim credit for their schemes. Entirely ignored
will be changes in the environment unrelated to
the safety program. The development of new
drugs such as the antibiotics, improvements in
communication, new surgical and medical techni-
ques, weather, and plain chance are just a fev of
the important factors for which allowances must
be made.'
The ultimate use of traffic accident data im-
portantly affects the method of collecting the
figures. Most standard statistical presentations
are based on a little information about a lot of
accidents. On the other hand most analysis requires
a lot of information from what must necessarily
be a few accidents because of the cost involved.
The sampling technique was developed to reduce
the cost of data collecting, but it has not been
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widely used by the police. Accident reporting is
adequate for collecting general traffic accident
statistics, but investigation on a sampling basis is
the only economically feasible method of gathering
more sophisticated data relating to cause or other
special problems of concern to police manage-
ment.
SPECIALIZATION AND STAFF ASSISTANCE
Although popularly located in the line, the
traffic unit-in the opinion of police experts such
as 0. W. Wilson and V. A. Leonard-should be
regarded primarily as a planning agency. They
considered it administrative error to give a
specialized unit large field strength and clothe it
with the main responsibility for carrying its plans
into action.
Authoritative writers on police administration,
universally advocate the use of a special staff unit
responsible for planning and coordinating activity
related to traffic operations; the product of their
efforts being fed in appropriate form to the uni-
formed patrol force. As a matter of fact, in actual
practice, the concept of staff assistance seems to
get lost in an operational traffic unit. Occasionally,
enforcement studies may be made in a traffic
division, but the conclusions, if any, seldom are
distributed for application by the patrol divisions.
The traffic division command becomes too busy
just managing its operations to provide assistance
to the other line functions. Consequently, coordina-
tion of effort is minimal. Sad examples of this are
the one-sentence mimeographed "blurbs" in the
Daily Bulletin epitomized by the following:
"Wednesday's high frequency accident location-
Lowe St. and East 14th St."
SPECIALIZATION AND EFFICIENCY
As in all police work, the distribution of man-
power by time and place assumes great importance
to a traffic division commander. However, at-
tempts to predict accident frequency as well as
their location have been successful only in a gross
sense. As a consequence, specialized accident in-
vestigation teams are often idle for long periods
of time. The most pronounced example of this
occurs on the early morning watches. Accident
investigation specialists must be on duty because
the regular patrolmen are not considered capable
of handling the occasional accident that happens
during the early morning hours. Any AI man can
testify to the many watches that slip by without
the occurrence of a single accident.
It may be argued that the special units perform
a useful patrol function through their presence
on the streets, but experience has shown that
problems of coordination of effort and supervision
always develop. Friction between regular patrol
elements and the special units over the handling
of report details is common when two different
line units work on the same incident.
Opposite the sterile periods of no accidents are
extremes posing even greater problems. A sudden
rainfall will precipitate a volume of accidents far
beyond the capacity of the special units. In spite
of careful assignment of the man, based on ingen-
ious statistical procedures, chance-in the form of
weather or other environmental changes-con-
tinually works to disrupt the finely worked out
plans. Those responsible for assignment of accident
investigators might just as well refer to a crystal
ball as their charts and tables.
To restate this point for emphasis, it must be
recognized that accidents are capricious in the
order of their occurrence. It is therefore less effi-
cient to maintain a corps of specialists on a con-
tingency basis than it would be to spread the
responsibility for accident reporting over a broader
base, that is, the patrol force.
SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT UNITS
The "'speed cop" is almost as American as the
"hot dog." To suggest that he has outlived his
usefulness is to risk burning at the stake for heresy
-or at least banishment from the police com-
munity.
Nevertheless, statements by competent ob-
servers of the police scene cannot be ignored. One
of the most respected leaders of police thought,
Bruce Smith, suggested in 1950 that we had
reached the point of diminishing returns from
special enforcement efforts per se. He was critical
of conventional traffic law enforcement with its
emphasis on specialization and selectivity, and he
advocated its application on a more equal basis
to everybody, everywhere. August Vollmer-
internationally celebrated for his contributions to
police practice-was especially critical of special
enforcement units. He often commented on the
enormous duplication of effort and waste of man-
hours resulting from splitting traffic tasks into
little islands of responsibility.
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A preceding section on the history of specializa-
tion contained a reference to the lack of interest
in traffic enforcement by patrolmen. Apathy on
the part of these officers is directly related to lack
of training and motivation. Another effective
factor is the morale problem created by special
pay and status afforded the motorcycle elite.
Special enforcement squards are justified only to
the extent the administrator is unwilling or unable
to train and motivate the general line units.
SPECIALIZATION AND TRAINING
Leonard, Wilson, and Clift have declared that
a department should resort to specialization only
where the load exceeds the capacity of the patrol
force. It seems that police management has seen
fit to follow the advice of the authorities in reverse.
The patrolman seldom was first given adequate
training and then the opportunity to handle acci-
dent investigation and traffic enforcement.
The F.B.I. has long advocated training each
member of the police force to a high level; recog-
nizing that excessive attention is often given to a
selected few officers to the detriment of the regular
patrolman. Bureau spokesmen have stated that
achievement of professional status awaits the
time the line officer becomes a whole policeman-
equipped with the skill and knowledge to do the
job. If we are to increase the efficiency of the
patrol forces, we must permit them, whenever
practical, to do tasks now performed by specialized
units.
New mechanical aids and structural reorganiza-
tion are relatively easy to introduce into the police
service. It is the upgrading of the human element
through training that presents the greatest chal-
lenge to police administrators.
SPECIALIZATION AND EMPLOYEE NEEDS
Satisfaction of the employee's needs should be a
matter of prime concern to all management. Al-
though the conventional approaches by progressive
organizations have been adequate in respect to
the physiological, safety, and social needs; a
modern school of thought postulates that there is
another cluster of needs with greater significance
to both management and man himself. These are
called the ego needs, and they involve two areas
of the personality. First there are needs relating
to a man's confidence and respect in himself; a
person needs to believe in his self-reliance, corn-
petance, and skill. Next are those needs relating
to reputation, as represented by the desire for
status and respect from one's peers.
Unlike the more basic needs, these are rarely
fully satisfied; moreover they do not appear in
any appreciable degree until the lower needs are
gratified. The typical police department offers
few opportunitites for the satisfaction of these
egotistic needs to people at the operational level,
for the practice of organizing policework along
highly specialized lines gives little heed to these
aspects of human motivation. If the police ad-
ministrators deliberately tried to thwart these
needs-which of course they do not-they could
hardly accomplish this purpose better than they
do.
The obvious remedy is to provide greater va-
riety, interest, and status to the patrolman's job.
SUMUhARY AND CONCLUSION
The arguments presented in this article are not
a defense of any particular norm or degree of
specialized activity, only a case for a shift in
emphasis. It is not logically possible to attack or
necessary to defend specialization in principle,
for it is an integral part of every organized group.
The critical question concerning specialization is
not "Yes or No," but "How Much?"
Police management should be concerned with
the amount of traffic specialization currently in
vogue and its effect on functional efficiency. Be-
cause the specialized traffic division is a well en-
trenched institution, its hierarchy will be certain
to resist changes that represent a threat to their
vested interest. The line power idea must therefore
be slowly and tactfully introduced so as to mini-
mize friction among the personnel affected. Patrol
officers in most modern departments today have
the competence to handle tasks presently assigned
to specialized units. Training is the catalyzing
agent needed to effect a program of despecializa-
tion. With the development of skill the regular
line officer can be assigned responsibility-under
adequate direction-for many traffic activities
now mainly handled by specialists.
A review of the classic pros and cons of speciali-
zation does:not provide much guidance when
structuring a police organization. Each depart-
ment is unique and the generalizations-mostly
subjective in tone-have little value in solving
their problems. What one author considers a dis-
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advantage will be praised by another as an ad-
vantage. A more useful approach is to "systemat-
ically challenge the obvious." It is simply good
business to evaluate periodically all reasons for
traffic specialization. When reviewing and weigh-
ing the pertinent factors, it should be remembered
that specialization may be indicated in one area
of traffic operations; yet not be warranted in
another.
In conclusion some general suggestions are made:
1. Teach Traffic Law Enforcement and Acci-
dent Reporting-in some depth-to all patrolmen.
In addition to the traditional method of teaching,
the field-coach system of training should be used.
The existing specialized units contain a ready-
made supply of these coaches.
2. Revise and simplify the Accident Report.
This will require the development of procedures
identifying the standard accident situations that
involve easily prosecuted violations. An exces-
sive amount of time should not be spent in docu-
menting and building up weak cases.
3. Use the most competent traffic men in a
small staff unit. Its responsibility is to conduct
analytical studies and coordinate traffic activities
of the patrol force.
4. Assign to the patrol divisions the responsi-
bility for reporting all routine traffic accidents.
5. Re-assign special traffic enforcement officers
to the patrol divisions as regular patrolmen.
Each of these suggestions would need detailed
study and development before being put to use.
Nevertheless, a department truly interested in
increasing efficiency through despecializing traffic
operations should be able to build effective pro-
cedures around the above recommendations.
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